This paper studies bank regulation in the presence of deposit insur ance, where banks have private information on their own ability and their investment strategy. Banks choose the mean and variance of their portfo lio return. Regulators wish to control banks' risk choice, even though all agents are risk neutral and there are no deadweight costs of bank failure, because high risk adversely a¤ects banks' ex ante incentives along other dimensions. Regulatory tools studied are capital requirements and returncontingent …nes. Regulators can seek to separate bank types by o¤ering a menu of contracts. We use numerical methods to study the prop erties of the model with two di¤erent bank types. Without …nes, capital require ments only have limited ability to separate bank types. When …nes are added, separation is much easier. Fine schedules and capital requirements are tailored to bank type. Low quality banks are …ned when they produce high returns in order to control risk-taking behavior. High quality banks face …nes on lower returns to prevent low-typ e banks from pretending they are high quality. Combining state-contingent …nes with capital regulation signi…cantly improves upon pure capital regulation.
Introduction
This paper studies bank regulation in a model where deposit insurance induces a wedge between private decisions and the social optimum. In this model, each bank has private information on its ability and chooses both the mean and variance of its investment portfolio. The regulator can set capital requirements and impose state-contingent …nes. Furthermore, the regulator may o¤er banks a menu of regulatory contracts. A key feature of this model is that banks that choose a lower portfolio variance also choose a portfolio with a higher mean. Thus, in contrast to our usual …nance intuition, bank portfolio returns endogenously exhibit a "reverse mean-variance trade-o¤ ". This feature can be exploited by the regulator to improve social welfare.
Often, the goal of regulation is described as "ensuring the safety and sound ness of the banking system". That is, the regulator seeks to reduce the overall risk of the bank sector. This goal is usually motivated by a desire to protect taxpayer liability, reduce failure resolution costs, or prevent systemic risk. We develop an alternative rationale for reducing bank risk that is complementary to, but distinct from, these standard rationales. In our paper, the cost to society of high failure risk is due to the way high risk distorts the ex-ante incentives of banks. For example, White (1991) argues that the cost of the United States Savings and Loans crisis was not primarily the deadweight societal cost of resolving the failed thrift institutions ex post. Rather, it was the cost of poor investment decisions made by thrifts before the wave of thrift failures started in the mid-1980's.
It is well known that many savings and loan institutions were technically insolvent in the early 1980's because they held a large amount of low-interest mortgages made before the in ‡ation of the late 1970's but had to pay the much higher market rate of interest for short-term liabilities that existed in the early 1980's. Mistaken attempts at deregulating the S&L's without proper supervi sory safeguards gave these insolvent thrifts the opportunity to increase their portfolio risk, in essence, to gamble for resurrection. White (1991) provides ev idence that failed thrifts were more likely to have engaged in real estate lending and other new activities that were not in the traditional purview of thrifts.
In this paper, we argue that this sort of fall in the diligence with which banks construct their asset portfolio is associated with an increase in bank risk. More precisely, if banks were required (or induced) to reduce the variance of their portfolio, they would also tend to expend more e¤ort increasing the mean of their portfolio return. Thus, the welfare-maximizing regulator ought to be concerned about reducing bank risk, but not necessarily because risk per se is costly, but because reduced bank risk leads banks to make better investments, thereby increasing the mean output of the economy and enhancing aggregate welfare.
In our model, the regulator cannot control bank risk directly, because the distribution of banks' portfolio returns is private information. This di¢culty in determining banks' ex ante return distributions, especially the return variance, is a fundamental practical problem for bank regulators. The Basel Committee on Bank Regulation continues to struggle with a practical way of measuring bank portfolio risk in its e¤orts to implement risk-based capital requirements. We capture this di¢culty in an extreme way by assuming that risk is completely un observable to the regulator. Therefore, risk must be controlled indirectly. The main regulatory tools available to do so in our model are state-contingent …nes. These …nes di¤er from most current regulatory practice, which relies primarily on non-state-contingent regulatory tools such as ex ante capital requirements. The Basel Accord of 1988 bases capital minimums on a crude risk-weighting of total assets held by a bank. Similarly, the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor poration Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) imposes capital requirements for U.S. banks. But recently, some state-contingent devices have become part of the regulatory tool kit. The prompt corrective action provisions of FDICIA can be viewed as state-contingent: if a bank's capital falls below a minimal value, sanctions can be imposed, including closure. State-contingent tools play an even more prominent role in the "internal models approach," a 1995 modi…cation to the Basel accord that applies to the trading books of large money center banks. This approach allows the bank to set its regulatory capital level using the Value at Risk (VaR) estimate produced by the bank's own risk model. Regulators backtest these models to determine if the bank's model is adequate or if it is accurately reporting its results. If a bank's model performs poorly, sanctions can be imposed. As argued by Rochet (1999) , these checks introduce some state-contingency into the regulatory mechanism. 1 Our model explicitly studies state-contingent regulation by allowing …nes to depend on the return produced by the bank. This paper builds on Marshall and Prescott (2001) , who study state-contingent …nes in a two-dimensional moral hazard model where both the mean and vari ance of the bank's portfolio return is private information. 2 They …nd that for lognormal distributions of returns it is optimal to impose …nes on banks that produce extremely high returns. This seemingly perverse result is driven by the need to control risk taking. It is desirable to impose …nes on return realizations with the highest deterrence e¤ect per dollar of …nes assessed in equilibrium. In the absence of limited liability, the optimal …ne would be placed on the extreme left-hand tail of the distributions. However, with limited liability …nes cannot be assessed on the left-hand tail so they are assessed on the right-hand tail 1 The "pre-commitment approach" is another state -contingent mechanism. Under pre commitment, banks would be allowed to choose their own level of capital but would be subject to a …ne if this capital did not cover ex post losses. In the proposal, …nes were to be used as the penalty but other penalties, such as increased capital or incre ased regulatory scrutiny, could be used as well (Kupiec and O'Brien (1995a,b) ). This approach was actually put forth by regulators for public comme nt (O¢ce of the Federal Register (1995)) but has not been adopted. 2 We also build other papers in the literature on bank regulation in the presence of private information. Antecedent papers include Giammarino, Lewis, and Sappington (1993), Campbell, Chan, and Marino (1992), Smith (1998, 2002) , Nagara jan and Sealy (1998), Besanko and Kanatas (1996) , and Matutes and Vives (2000) . Also relevant is the small principal-agent literature on when the agent controls risk. See, for example, Palomino and Prat (2003) .
instead. 3 An obvious issue raised by this result is that if some banks are higher qual ity than others, and if bank quality is private information, …nes on high returns may simply punish the high quality banks rather than deterring risk-taking by low quality banks, and may even deter innovation. (See Boyd (2001) ). By in corporating unobservable heterogeneity in bank types, our model can address this trade-o¤. The model contains both low and high quality banks. Low type banks have little incentive to expend e¤ort to increase their portfolio quality. In contrast, high-type banks make the socially optimal e¤ort choice even in the absence of regulation. We …nd that, as in Marshall and Prescott (2001) , the optimal contract still imposes …nes on high returns for the low-type banks. However, these …nes are not imposed on the high-type banks because the regulator can separate types by o¤ering a menu of contracts. Low-type banks choose the contract with high return …nes, while high-type banks choose an alternative con tract. However, because the regulator cannot observe bank type, the contracts on the menu must induce self selection. Consequently, some punitive measures need to be included in the high-type contract, even though, in the absence of unobserved heterogeneity the high-type would be self-regulating. This must be done to convince the low-type to truthfully report their type. Furthermore, we …nd that the costs of private information about bank type are borne entirely by the higher quality bank. The lower-quality bank always receives at least as much utility as it would have under type-observability.
The problem is very di¢cult to analyze. There are two dimensions to the moral-hazard problem and there is private information on bank type. 4 Furthermore, the capital requirement, while observable, a¤ects incentives. Because of these complications, we explore the model by using numerical methods to solve and analyze speci…c parametric examples. We transform the problem into a linear program as in Myerson (1982) , Prescott and Townsend (1984) , and oth ers. Even solving this linear program is not straightforward because of the large number of o¤-equilibrium strategies that need to be checked to preserve incen tive compatibility. We use a method developed in Prescott (2003) that e¢ciently checks these strategies. The numerical methods are described in Appendix B.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops the model. Section 3 derives some comparative static results on the connection between bank behavior and capital requirements. It also provides some conditions under which a decreased return variance induces a bank to increase its portfolio mean. Section 4 reports in detail the optimal contracts for a variety of parametric examples. The …nal section o¤ers some concluding comments. Technical 3 The result is similar to that of Green (1984) who studied risk control in a non-banking environment. 4 There is a small literature on two-stage problems that start with hidden information and then follow with moral hazard. Papers on this problem include Christenson (1981), Baiman and Evans (1983) , Penno (1984) , La¤ont and Tirole (1986) , McAfee and McMillan (1987) , Demougin (1989) , Melamud and Reichelstein (1989) , and Prescott (2003) . These papers study a substantially simpler moral hazard problem than we do, and do not incorporate elements like capital requirements. Furthermore, this literature has been primarily focused on conditions under which a report on private information is valuable. details can be found in the two appendices.
The Model

Households
There are two periods and a single consumption goo d. There is a continuum of risk-neutral households of measure one who consume in the second period only. The households own all the assets in the economy, consume all the output, and operate all the banks. Each household includes one "banker", who is one of two types, low and high. Low-type bankers are bad at operating a bank while high-type bankers are good at bank operation. (We discuss the consequences of bank type more formally below.) Let h i denote the fraction of households with a type i banker, for i 2 flow; highg.
In the …rst period, a household receives an endowment of one unit of the consumption good. Each type of household must split this endowment between capital to use in its own bank and funds to deposit in other banks. Demand deposits pay o¤ one unit of the consumption good in the second period for each unit invested in the …rst period. In addition to its pecuniary payo¤, a unit of bank deposits provides liquidity services with utility value ½ > 0. All demand deposits are government insured, so the household is indi¤erent about which bank holds its deposits.
For simplicity, we assume that each bank can only be of size one. 5 A typei bank funds its investments with deposits from outsiders D i 2 [0; 1]. The remaining portion of the investment, 1 ¡ D i , is funded by the banker's own funds. These own funds will be called capital. Since every bank must be the same size, the deposits made by the household must equal D i , the deposits its bank takes from other households. We make the assumption that a household may not place deposits in its own bank. This assumption captures the idea that depositors do not monitor their bank because of deposit insurance.
We do not model the individual assets of a bank's investment portfolio. Instead, we assume that the bank chooses the distribution of its portfolio return. Let r denote the gross return accruing to a bank. This portfolio return has a cdf F (¢j¹; ¾ ), where F is a two-parameter family of probability distributions completely characterized by its mean ¹ and variance ¾ 2 .
For simplicity of exposition, we assume that there exists a pdf corresponding to F (¢j¹; ¾). This pdf is denoted f (¢j¹; ¾). For most commonly used two-parameter distributions, the value of f (rj¹; ¾) is decreasing in ¹ for r su¢ciently small. Accordingly, we assume that there exists an r ¤ (¹; ¾) such that @f (rj¹; ¾) < 0; 8r < r ¤ (¹; ¾) :
(1) @¹ For example, equation (1) holds for the normal distribution with r ¤ (¹; ¾) = ¹; it holds for the log normal distribution for an r ¤ (¹; ¾) > ¹: The bank chooses two characteristics of the portfolio. The …rst is the portfolio standard deviation ¾, which measures the bank's risk choice. The second is the bank's level of screening e¤ort, s ¸ 0. We think of screening e¤ort as the amount of diligence applied in evaluating loans and other assets. Screening positively a¤ects the mean of the distribution, denoted ¹ i (s), where
The only di¤erence between the two bank types is that a given amount of screening e¤ort results in a higher mean return for the high types than for the low types. That is,
The cdf of the return of bank of type i that chooses screening s and risk ¾ will be denoted F i (¢js; ¾) where
The pdf corresponding to this cdf will be denoted f i (¢js; ¾). Screening s also has a utility cost °s, with °> 0. In addition to the banks and households, there is a regulator who seeks to maximize social welfare. (We characterize explicitly the regulator's objective in Section 2.2, below.) The regulator may impose …nes, g i (r ), as a function of the bank's type and ex post return. These …nes are non-negative, and are constrained by limited liability of the bank. Consequently,
The expected payo¤ of the i th bank, denoted v i , is
The household purchases consumption in the second period using its bank deposits (which are distinct from but equal in amount to the deposits received by its banker), plus the pro…ts from its banker's activities, less a lump sum tax (common across types) with expected value T that is used by the deposit insurer to pay o¤ the depositors of failed banks. Therefore, the expected consumption for a household with bank type i, denoted C i , is subject to the constraint
Household utility is a linear function of consumption, liquidity services pro vided by deposits and the disutility of screening e¤ort:
Using equations (6) and (7) we can write the bank's utility function (8) in an alternative form:
0 0 (9) The …rst term in equation (9) has the form of the payo¤ to a put option with strike price D i . This term captures what is commonly referred to as the deposit insurance put option. In e¤ect, deposit insurance gives the bank an option to put the bank to the deposit insurer in exchange for the insurer taking over the liability D i owed to the depositors. The second term is the income lost from …nes. The third term is the value of liquidity services received from deposits. The fourth term is the mean return to the bank's portfolio. The …fth term is the lost utility due to screening. Notice that the household/banker takes taxes as given. 6 
Regulator
To cover the cost of bank failure, the regulator can use lump sum taxes and the …nes it collects. We assume that …nes are costly to collect, due to their punitive nature. In particular, there is a deadweight cost of ¿ ¸ 0 per unit …ne collected. Therefore, taxes must satisfy
(10) The regulator maximizes the share-weighted average of the ex ante utilities of the two types of households, as given in equation (9) , subject to equations (5), (6) , (7), and (10). 7 However, the regulator takes into account the e¤ect on utility of taxes T in equation (9) while the bank takes them as exogenous. These taxes lay at the heart of the distortion caused by deposit insurance.
Suppose the regulator could observe banks' types and control their choices of fD i ; s i ; ¾ i g. Substituting equations (6), (7) , and (10) into the utility function of each bank (equation (8)) and then weighing each type by their fraction of the population, one obtains the following expression for the regulator's objective function 6 Static models of bank regulation often include a franchise value or charter value term in the bank's objective function. (See, e.g., Keeley (1990) , Marshall and Venkataraman (1999) .) This term is a stand-in for the present value of the bank's future operations, which is lost to the bank owners in the event of bankruptcy. Concern for lost franchise value acts as a disincentive to risk taking, and thus can o¤set the risk-encouraging e¤ects of the deposit insurance put option. Franchise value could easily be incorporated into this model. We refrain from doing so in order to focus attention speci…cally on the way the deposit insurance put option distorts bank incentives. 7 We do not address potential incentive problems with the regulator's behavior.
i 0
The object in square brackets in equation (11) is the utility of the type-i household from the perspective of the regulator. Ignoring …nes and taxes (the latter of which does not a¤ect the bank's decisions), the only di¤erence between this expression and equation (9) is that equation (9) includes the payo¤ to the deposit insurance put option. Because of this di¤erence in objective functions, an unregulated banks' decisions would generally be socially suboptimal. As we shall see, banks have an incentive to take on too much leverage, too much risk, and apply insu¢cient screening e¤ort.
Formal Statement of the Regulator's Problem
In the most general speci…cation of the model, the regulator observes deposits D and the bank's ex post return r , but the bank's type i and action pair (s; ¾) is private information. Thus, the regulator's problem is to use instruments that condition on D and r to elicit information about bank type and to in ‡uence the bank's action choices. Formally, the problem takes the following steps: First, banks send reports to the regulator on their type i. The content of these reports cannot be veri…ed by the regulator so the bank can say anything. However, we know by the Revelation Principle that as long as we impose the right incentive constraints, we can restrict ourselves to a direct mechanism where a bank directly reports its type. Second, based on this report of i, the regulator sets a deposit level D i , recommends a screening-risk pair fs i ; ¾ i g, and sets a schedule of …nes g i (r) that depends on the portfolio return r. The deposit level is interpreted as a capital requirement, since capital equals 1 ¡ D i . We refer to a triplet of the deposit level, screening, and risk, (D; s; ¾); as an assignment. Third, in response to the assignment and …ne schedule, the bank chooses its screening and risk levels (which need not equal the (s; ¾) pair recommended in the regulator's assignment). Fourth and …nally, the return is realized, …nes and taxes are assessed, the depositors are paid o¤ (either by the bank or the deposit insurer), and each household consumes.
Using the Revelation Principle, the regulator's problem can be summarized as follows:
Regulator's Problem
subject to equation (5), the following truth-telling incentive constraints
s; ¾ 0
and the constraint in equation (10) that lump-sum taxes cover the costs of bank failure resolution net of …nes collected. The moral hazard incentive constraints (14) require that, for the deposit level and …ne schedule speci…ed for each bank type, the recommended values of screening e¤ort and risk are those that would be chosen by that type. The truth telling constraints (13) guarantee that banks truthfully report their type. The max operator on the right-hand side of equation (13) is needed because the optimal contract does not specify the o¤-equilibrium strategy to be used by a bank that lies. The utility from this strategy needs to be calculated to properly assess the value to a bank of misrepresenting its type. Finally, note that while T is in both sets of incentive constraints it enters as a constant and has no e¤ect on sets of feasible allocations that satisfy either constraint.
Some Useful Comparative Static Results
Before analyzing the complete Regulator's Problem it is useful to look at the bank's incentives in the absence of …nes. These comparative static results in dicate the direction in which the bank would change its actions in response to possible regulatory policies.
Unregulated banks choose suboptimally low screening
Let us consider …rst the incentives of unregulated banks. In particular, we set g i (r ) = 0; 8r. According to equation (11) , the choice of ¾ does not directly a¤ect the value of the regulator's ob jective in the absence of …nes. Thus, the key concern of the regulator is to move the banks' screening e¤ort toward the social optimum. According to equation (11), the socially optimal screening level for bank i is characterized by
that is, the marginal increase in the mean return must equal ° , the marginal cost of screening. However, according to equation (9), the privately optimal screening level is characterized by
0
We now show that if D is not too big relative to the mean of the distribution then the bank's choice of screening is strictly lower than the social optimum.
Equations (15) and (16) di¤er by a term that captures the way the deposit insurance put option varies with s. Using equations (1), (2), and (4), we can sign this term, as follows:
According to equation (17), the left-hand side of (16) exceeds the left-hand side of (15) as long as the deposit level D is not too big. 8 If this condition holds then equation (3) implies that the value of s i ensuring equation (16) is strictly lower than the value of s i implied by equation (15) . In other words, the unregulated bank's screening choice is strictly less than the socially optimal screening level. The condition that D is not too big is not too restrictive. For example, in the case of the normal or log normal family of distributions, inequality (1) holds for all r < ¹. Since D · 1 and the mean of the gross return exceeds unity (assuming that the bank expects a positive net return to its investments), then the condition that D not be too big holds automatically.
If bank screening e¤ort were observable, the regulator could presumably mandate the optimal screening level directly. However, throughout this paper we assume that screening e¤ort is unobservable to the regulator. So how might the regulator induce the bank to increase its screening level? The conventional regulatory tool is increased capital. It turns out that mandating higher capital does indeed induce higher screening e¤ort. A second, less obvious tool, which will be an important focus later in this paper, is to induce the bank to reduce its risk choice. In the following, we explore each of these approaches in turn.
Inducing higher screening e¤ort via capital regulation
Suppose …nes are excluded from the available regulatory instruments, so the only regulatory tool is capital requirements. We show here that higher capital 8 In fact, the condition D < r ¤ (¹; ¾) is su¢cient, but not necessary for the left-hand side of equation (17) to be negative. All that is needed is for D to be su¢ciently small that the set of r < r ¤ (¹; ¾) dominates the sign of the weighted integral in equation (17) . tends to induce higher screening. Recall that capital simply equals 1 ¡ D, so mandating increased capital is equivalent to mandating a lower value for D . Suppose the regulator sets D and the bank then chooses s. The following comparative static result holds:
Then, holding ¾ constant, the bank's choice of s is decreasing in D .
(Proof See Appendix A.) According to Proposition 1, the regulator can induce banks to increase s by requiring them to reduce D , in other words, by increasing capital.
How does the risk level a¤ect screening e¤ort?
For most of this paper we assume that the bank's choice of risk, ¾, is private information. But suppose for a moment that ¾ were observable to the regulator, and that the regulator could mandate a ¾ level for the bank. How would the regulator's choice of ¾ a¤ect the bank's choice of s? In this section we show that, for a wide range of speci…cations, s would be decreasing in ¾. That is, the regulator could induce higher screening (thereby o¤setting the distortions induced by the deposit insurance put option) by reducing the bank's portfolio risk.
To demonstrate this assertion, let us totally di¤erentiate the bank's …rst order condition (16) with respect to ¾ and rearrange to get
According to equation (4),
so equation (18) can be written
According to second-order condition (25) in the Appendix A, the denominator @s of (19) is negative. So to sign @¾ we must determine the sign of the numerator of equation (19) . This object cannot be signed unambiguously. ¹ 0 (s) > 0 by construction, so @s @¾ < 0 if and only if (20)
The integral in equation (21) is the second (cross) derivative of the deposit insur ance put option with respect to the mean and standard deviation of the return distribution. So equations (20) - (21) say that increased portfolio risk induces a reduction in screening e¤ort if and only if the sign of this cross derivative is negative. The sign of this cross derivative depends on the sign of f ¹¾ (r ), which in turn depends on where r is located relative to the mean and standard deviation of the distribution, as well as on the shape of the distribution itself. It is a property of most commonly used two-parameter distributions that f ¹¾ (r) < 0 for all r su¢ciently small. In particular, if f is normal, then
We were unable to obtain a similar analytic result for the log normal distribution, but a grid search over a wide range of ¹'s and ¾'s reveals that, for f lognormal, a su¢cient condition for f ¹¾ (r j¹; ¾) < 0 is 9
r < e E log( r)¡¾ (log(r)) p
where E log (r) and ¾ (log(r)) denote the mean and standard deviation, respec tively, of log (r). The analogy between equations (22) and (23) is obvious. These results suggest that, unless ¹ is very small or ¾ is very big, inequality (21) should hold. To check this conjecture, we numerically evaluate the lefthand side of inequality (21) If we think of the return horizon as one year, these grids encompass the realistic cases. For the log normal distribution, inequality (21) holds for all values of f¾; Dg as long as ¹ ¸ 1:2 (that is, a mean net return of at least 20%). If ¹ ¸ 1:0 (positive mean net return), inequality (21) holds except for very high risk levels ( ¾ ¸ :7), and is there only when D = 1 (i.e., zero capital). We perform the same experiment with the beta distribution with support (0; 3) that is used in Section 4.2, below. 10 With this distribution, inequality (21) holds for all f¾; Dg in this grid as long as 1:0 · ¹ · 2:0 (that is, the mean net return is between 9 More precisely, there exists an r
In practice, we …nd that for most values of f¹; ¾g ; log [r
.t. f¹¾ (rj¹; ¾) < 0 if r < r ¤¤ (¹; ¾) : 0 and 100%). Thus, @s @ ¾ < 0 for these two distributions when the mean and variance are in the empirically plausible region.
This section showed that, for a wide variety of plausible distributions, reduc ing the risk of a bank's portfolio tends to increase its level of screening e¤ort. But, for most of this paper we assume that the regulator cannot observe the bank's portfolio risk. How then are the results of this section useful? While the regulator cannot mandate a risk level, the regulator may be able to convince the bank to choose lower risk by indirect means, such as ex post return-contingent …nes. According to the results of this section, doing so will result in the bank choosing a higher screening level. This is what we …nd in our numerical simu lations, described in Sections 4.3 and 4.4.2, below.
An Example
It is very di¢cult to characterize the Regulator's Problem analytically. First, it contains a moral hazard problem with two dimensions (screening and risk) on which the bank chooses its hidden action. Second, the moral hazard is preceded by hidden information on bank quality. Third, the regulator also chooses a de posit level, which, while observable, complicates the problem because it directly a¤ects incentive constraints.
Because of these di¢culties, we adopt the strategy of solving numerical ex amples to learn about the properties of this model. In this section we …rst describe our approach to solving the model. We then use this approach to solve a set of examples that illustrate how …nes are an e¤ective way to control risk, and by extension, control screening. In particular, our examples illustrate that high-return …nes can be used to deter risk-taking by the low-type banks whether or not bank type is public information.
Solving the model numerically
We solve the Regulator's Problem numerically by formulating it as a linear program. Linear programs are an e¤ective tool for computing solutions to mech anism design problems. 1 1 They can be used to solve problems with arbitrary speci…cations of preferences and technologies. Furthermore, linear programs can be e¢ciently solved using widely available, high quality software.
To formulate the problem as a linear program, one …rst must discretize all underlying variables. In our model, we discretize returns r, and …nes g, screening levels s, risk choices ¾, and deposit levels D. The regulator then chooses a joint probability distribution over the possible combinations of these variables. Embedded in this joint probability distribution is the terms of the regulatory contract. Thus, this solution method allows for the possibility of randomized contracts. Indeed, allowing for randomization is the key step in transforming the problem into a linear program. However, we will focus primarily on cases where the contracts are deterministic (that is, where the probability distribution associated with the optimal contract is degenerate). 12 The major complication with this approach is checking the truth-telling in centive constraints. As mentioned above, the truth-telling constraints guarantee that the utility from correctly reporting type dominates the utility from lying and then taking some feasible o¤-equilibrium strategy. One way to guarantee truth-telling is to check each possible o¤-equilibrium strategy. This is the stan dard method, as in Myerson (1982) . Unfortunately, as we describe in Appendix B, our problem involves an astronomical number of such constraints. Instead, we use a method developed in Prescott (2003) that takes advantage of the max operator in equation (13) to more e¢ciently check the truth-telling constraints. A detailed, self-contained, description of the numerical solution procedure can be found in Appendix B.
Parameterization
We assume that there are four possible levels of screening e¤ort, We assume that the increasing, concave function ¹ i mapping bank type i's screening e¤ort into its portfolio mean takes the negative exponential form: 1 2 In the case where bank type is observable, the optimal contract can always be achieved with deterministic contracts. Intuitively, the only way randomization could be useful is if the bank makes a decision prior to the realization of the random assignment. When type is observable, the only choices that the banks make are their screening and risk choices. These are made after the assignment is made, so the regulator need never randomize the assignment. 1 3 The use of only two risk levels can be motivated by the result in Marshall and Prescott (2001) , that if banks' portfolio returns are log normal, and if banks can choose from a closed interval of risk levels, their optimal choice would always be one of the two endpoints. That is, for any give combination fD; sg, an interior solution for ¾ is never chosen by the bank.
Note that the ¹ h ig h (¢) schedule represents a parallel upward shift of the ¹ low (¢) schedule.
Our solution method requires discretization of the distributions. Since dis cretization e¤ectively imposes upper and lower bounds on the distribution, it is natural to start with distributions that have bounded support. In particular, we assume that all return distributions are from the beta family of distributions. Since the beta is a two-parameter distribution, it is completely described by its mean and variance (along with its upper and lower bounds). We assume the support of all distributions is the open interval (0; 3:0). We thus must construct a beta distribution with this support for each combination of ftype; s; ¾g : We then discretize these distributions on the following seven-point grid: Finally, we set the cost of capital ½ = 0:05, the social cost of …nes ¿ = 0:01, and the cost of screening e¤ort ° = 1:0.
Before turning to the optimal regulation in this example, let us look at the optimal bank choices in the unregulated case where no …nes are imposed and D = 1 (zero capital). Table 1 gives the value of the bank's objective function (equation (9)) and the regulator's objective function (equation (11)) for each type and each choice of fs; ¾g. (The value of the bank's objective excludes the lump sum tax, which does not a¤ect bank incentives.) Note …rst that the regulator wants both banks to choose s = 0:4. Lower values of screening e¤ort are insu¢ciently productive, but the highest value s = 0:5 incurs a suboptimally high disutility of e¤ort. Note also that, with no deadweight cost of bankruptcy, the regulator is indi¤erent between high and low risk.
Turning to the values of the banks' objectives, the high type's preferred action is s = 0:4 and ¾ = 1:0. Since this maximizes the regulator's objective, the high-type bank is self-regulating in this example. In contrast, the low-type bank prefers the highest risk level with s = 0:3. So the task facing the regulator is to induce the low-type bank to increase its screening to s = 0:4: Note also that if the low type were forced to choose the lower risk level, the optimal choice of screening would coincide with the regulatory optimum s = 0:4. However, if the high type were forced to choose low risk, its ob jective would be maximized at the suboptimally high level s = 0:5. These e¤ects of risk reduction are examples of the result in Section 3.3 that for a large set of plausible portfolio distributions, screening is decreasing in risk. This will be an important consideration in the optimal regulatory design. Inducing the low type directly to choose the socially 1 4 For each combination of screening e¤ort and risk, there is a unique beta distribution on support (0; 3). We discretize each distribution by evaluating the be ta density at each of the seven grid points, and then adding " i to the i th grid point's probability, where f" ig
are chosen to minimize
2 i subject to the constraints that the resulting probabilities sum to unity and that the mean and variance of the discrete distribution exactly match the mean and variance of the original beta distribution. Since very small probabilities often introduce numerical instability in our solution algorithm, we then do a second round of ad hoc adjustments to ensure that no single probability is less than 0.001, that the means hold exactly, and that the variances are close to the target variances. optimal screening level is di¢cult. However, if the regulator can induce the low type to choose low risk, it will be optimal for the bank to then select the optimal screening level, which is the prime concern of the regulator.
At …rst glance, the results in Table 1 suggest that the screening level s = 0:2 is extraneous since it appears to be neither privately nor socially optimal: No unregulated bank would ever choose this screening level, nor would the regulator ever mandate it. However, as we shall discuss below, once …nes are imposed screening may be so unappealing to the bank that a s = 0:2 deviation is a possibility that needs to be prevented.
Optimal Regulation when bank type is observed
Marshall and Prescott (2001) studied optimal regulation in this model when bank type is observable. It is useful to revisit this simpler case in the context of our baseline parameterization to provide a benchmark against which the results with unobserved heterogeneity can be compared. Several of the forces opera tional in that model are operational in the heterogenous agent model as well. Furthermore, the implications of the model for this case raise some interesting issues that the analysis with unobserved heterogeneity may be able to clarify.
We determine the optimal contract for each of the two types, both for pure capital requirements (no …nes permitted) and for the case where both capital requirements and ex post …nes are available. The results in the case of pure capital regulation for the two bank types are displayed in the …rst column of Table 2 . The optimal contracts induce high screening and high variance for both types. The high type is fully leveraged, while the low type has a capital level of 14%. The low type needs this capital requirement to induce socially optimal screening. This is an example of Proposition 1 in Section 3.2, above. In contrast, as we discussed in Section 4.2, above, the high type chooses this optimal screening level even in the absence of a capital requirement.
We now introduce …nes as a second regulatory instrument in addition to capital. The results for this case are displayed in the …rst column of Table  3 . Note that in this case …nes completely displace capital, since capital is a more costly way of in ‡uencing bank incentives than state-contingent …nes. In particular, the optimal contract assigns the low type 0% capital (D = 1), with the low risk and s = 0:4. The low type is induced to take this strategy by the use of a …ne of 1.8910 that is assessed if the highest return is produced. There are no …nes imposed on the other returns. Fining a bank for doing well may seem counterintuitive but it is actually a simple application of the likelihood ratio principle; which is relevant for optimal incentive contracts. This principle can be understood as follows: Fines have two e¤ects on the moral-hazard incentive constraints: They hurt banks who take the recommended strategy, and they also hurt those that deviate. The relative size of these e¤ects at a particular return level r , is determined by the likelihood ratio, LR (r ), de…ned as 15 prob (rj deviating strategy followed) LR (r ) ´ prob (rj recommended strategy followed) :
This ratio can be interpreted as the prevention per unit of …ne assessed in equilibrium. It is generally desirable to impose the …ne on the return with the highest likelihood ratio. For this example, the investment strategy of most concern to the regulator is where s = 0:2 and ¾ = 1:0: 16 The likelihood ratio for this deviation is highest at r = 0:04, the return in the extreme left-hand tail of the distribution: The regulator would like to impose the …ne on this return but cannot because of limited liability. The return with the next highest likelihood ratio for this deviation is r = 2:96, the return in the extreme right-hand tail. Fines can be assessed for this return without violating limited liability, so this is the return level that receives the …ne.
Inspection of this contract reveals why capital is not used. The …ne on the highest return is strictly below the maximum feasible …ne, given limited liability, of 1.96. If this …ne were insu¢cient to induce optimal screening, it could be increased at the margin, thereby strengthening incentives without using costly capital. In our numerical simulations, we …nd that as long as …nes have a low regulatory cost compared to capital, capital and …nes coexist in the same contract only if at least one …ne is at the bound imposed by the limited liability constraint.
Another important point that is illustrated by this example is that the bind ing incentive constraint need not be near the equilibrium choice. That is, it need not be a local incentive constraint.
In particular, while the lowest screening level s = 0:2 is never chosen by an unregulated bank, the binding incentive constraint in this example is to prevent deviation from fs = 0:4; ¾ = 0:6g to fs = 0:2; ¾ = 1:0g. The reason is that the high …ne on the right-hand tail of the distribution induces the bank to reduce the probability of the highest return. But there are two ways it can do so: by reducing ¾ or by reducing ¹ via a reduction in screening e¤ort all the way to s = 0:2. The former is the e¤ect desired by the regulator; the latter needs to be avoided as represented by the binding incentive constraint.
This example illustrates why the …rst-order approach to incentive constraints does not work in this model. In the …rst-order approach (see Hart and Holm strom (1987) ) the incentive constraints are replaced with the …rst-order condi tions to the agents subproblem; but these are necessary rather than su¢cient conditions. Without strong assumptions, there is no guarantee that a solution to the program with the …rst-order conditions is the same as the solution to the global program. In particular, the program utilizing …rst-order conditions would treat certain globally infeasible allocations as if they were feasible. In our example, since local incentive constraints do not bind, it would actually select one of these (infeasible) allocations as the solution to the regulatory problem. Our linear programming method is a global method so we do not have to worry about this possibility.
Optimal regulation with unobserved heterogeneity
According to the results in Section 4.3, the optimal structure of ex post …nes for the low type is to impose large …nes on the highest return level. In other words, banks are penalized for doing extremely well. This seemingly perverse result is actually quite intuitive, since an extremely high return to a low-type bank is a reasonably good signal of excessive risk-taking. The penalty structure could be duplicated by requiring the bank to issue warrants or convertible debt with a high strike price. However, one important concern with such a regulatory …ne schedule is that some banks may have a high return not because they took excessive risks, but simply because they are good banks. They may have better management or they may have a more favorable investment opportunity set. In this section, we address this concern by solving the Regulator's Problem de…ned earlier, in which bank type is unobservable. With unobserved bank quality, we can investigate the trade-o¤s between the good and bad incentive e¤ects of high-return …nes.
Optimal capital requirements without …nes in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity
When …nes are not used, the optimal capital requirements when bank type is unobserved in the baseline case are displayed in the last three columns of Table  2 . The table gives the optimal regulatory contracts for the two types as the fraction of high types, h high , varies from .01 to .995. When h high is not too big (less than 86%), the optimal regulatory strategy is to assign both types 14% capital, which is the optimal type-observable contract for the low type. That is, no e¤ort is made to separate types. The reason is that this contract is the least expensive contract (from the regulator's standpoint) that induces the low-type bank to choose the highest screening level. While this contract is decidedly inferior from the perspective of the high-type bank, the only alternative from the regulator's perspective is to let the low-type bank choose a lower screening level. The social cost to this alternative exceeds the social cost of the capital requirements imposed on the high-type bank.
When h high is very high (87% or higher), the regulator again makes no e¤ort to separate type. For these values of h hig h , the regulator simply assigns both types of banks zero capital, which of course is the optimal type-observable contract for the high type. The low type bank responds by setting s = 0:3, a socially suboptimal screening level. There are so few low-type banks that the regulator is willing to tolerate this suboptimal screening by low-type banks in order to save the capital costs incurred by the high-type banks.
Finally, for h h ig h in a narrow range near 0:86; the optimal regulation is to separate types by o¤ering di¤erent contracts to each type. While this would be impossible with non-random contracts (since both bank types would choose the lower-capital alternative), it is possible in theory to separate types by o¤ering the low-type bank a random contract while o¤ering the high-type bank a nonrandom contract. The reason this is possible is that the bank's objective function is nonlinear in D because it incorporates the payo¤ to the deposit insurance put option. The expected payo¤ of a put option is strictly convex in its strike price. In our example, the put option term has strictly greater curvature for the low type bank than for the high type bank, so, as an implication of Jensen's inequality, the low-type bank has a greater preference for randomness. To separate types, one simply o¤ers the high type bank a nonrandom capital level while o¤ering the low type bank a random capital level with a somewhat lower mean. We see this in the second-to-last column of Table 2 for h hig h = 86%. The optimal contract exploits this possibility by giving the high type a deterministic contract with 1% capital, while giving the low type a mixed contract that imposes 14% capital with 7% probability and zero capital with 93% probability. We …nd it interesting that in the numerical simulations we have studied, this type of randomized contract is optimal only for a very narrow set of parameters. For the vast majority of examples, separation of types with pure capital regulation is suboptimal.
Optimal regulation using both capital and …nes in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity
The optimal contracts for the baseline parameterization when both …nes and capital are used are displayed in Table 3 . The …rst two rows of Table 3 give details of the contract for the low type. The second row is only used when the optimal contract is a mixture of two contract elements. The third row gives the optimal contract for the high type. (In the baseline parameterization mixed contracts are never used for the high-type bank.) As described in Section 4.3, the …rst column gives the optimal type-observable contracts. The remaining three columns give the contracts as the fraction of high types h h ig h ranges from 1% to 99.5%. When bank type is unobservable, the optimal type-observable contracts for the two bank types cannot be implemented simultaneously. The reason is that the contract for the high type (zero capital, zero …nes) is more attractive to the low type than its own contract (zero capital, high …ne on the highest output level). So, the low type would invariably misrepresent its type, receive the high-type contract, and then use a suboptimally low screening level.
To remedy this problem the regulator can choose one of three alternatives:
1. Assign the low type its optimal observable-type contract, and impose suf …cient penalties on the high type (either in the form of …nes or capital requirements) so that the low type has no incentive to misrepresent type.
2. Assign the high type its optimal observable-type contract, and give the low type a (socially suboptimal) contract that is su¢ciently attractive so that low-type banks have no incentive to misrepresent type.
3. Assign neither type its optimal observable-type contract; and craft a set of contracts such that neither bank type has an incentive to misrepresent type.
Not surprisingly, we …nd that the optimal choice among these three alterna tives depends on the fraction h high of high-type banks. In particular, alternative (1) is used when h hig h is relatively low, alternative (2) is used when h high is extremely high, and alternative (3) is used for intermediate values of h high .
In the baseline case, the low-type contract is the same as the optimal contract under type-observability as long as the fraction of high types is not too high (h hig h below 88%). This is clearly evident in Table 3 . For these values of h high , however, the contract for the high type imposes …nes at return levels 2:0 and 2:5. These …nes are substantial. At return 2:0, over 89% of the bank's pro…t (after paying o¤ depositors) is …ned away; at return 2:5 approximately 29% of the pro…t is …ned. So, while the low type receives the same contract as she would if type could be observed, the high type must pay heavy …nes in order to dissuade the low types from masquerading as high types.
Neither …ne in the high-type contract is constrained by limited liability, so one might think that these two …nes play distinct roles. This is partially correct. Two constraints bind in this contract. The …rst binding constraint is the truth telling constraint preventing low types from pro…ting by misrepresenting their type and choosing fs; ¾g = f0:3; 1:0g. The second binding constraint is the incentive constraint preventing the high type from choosing the suboptimally high screening e¤ort of s = 0:5. Consider Table 4 , which gives the values of bank and regulatory objectives for fs; ¾g pair under both the optimal low-type contract and the optimal high-type contract. Note that the highest value of the low type's objective from truth-telling is 1.7924, attained at the socially optimal action pair fs; ¾g = f0:4; 0:6g. But the low type can attain this precise value by misrepresenting herself as a high type and choosing the socially suboptimal action pair fs; ¾g = f0:3; 1:0g. Thus, the truth-telling constraint binds with respect to this deviating action. If the …ne on either return 2:0 or 2:5 were reduced, this constraint would be violated and the low-type bank would pro…t from lying and misbehaving.
Note also that the high-type's objective attains its maximum of 1.69761 at either the socially optimal action pair fs; ¾g = f0:4; 0:1g or at the socially suboptimal pair fs; ¾g = f0:5; 0:1g. Thus, the high-type's incentive constraint binds with respect to this latter action. If the …ne on r = 2:5 were reduced (without a concomitant reduction in the …ne on r = 2:0), this constraint would be violated. 17 In other words, if only a …ne at r = 2:0 were used to dissuade low-type banks from lying, the …ne itself would induce high-type banks to screen excessively, an action that bank would never take in the unregulated case. An additional …ne at r = 2:5 is needed to correct this perverse incentive. This is an example of a possibility that can occur in optimal mechanism design when both moral hazard and adverse selection are present: A contractual provision designed to alleviate the adverse selection problem can itself exacerbate the moral hazard problem, requiring additional regulatory correction.
This contract on the high types is inferior to their optimal type-observable contract, both from the perspective of social utility and private bank utility. Table 5 reports the social value of each contract, the private value of each contract before taxes (which is what matters for incentives) and the private value of the contract after taxes. For purposes of utility comparison, we treat the type-observable case as if the tax levies on the two types acted as actuarially fair deposit insurance premiums. That is, the costs of failure resolution for a given bank type are assessed only on the banks of that type.
18 Table 5 shows that the social utility of the optimal observable-type contract for high banks is 1.71993. In contrast, the social utility of the equilibrium high-type contract when bank type is unobservable is lower. For h hig h below 0.88, this value is 1.71867. This small di¤erence is the social cost of private information about bank characteristics. The reason this cost is so small is that in both contracts the high bank makes the optimal screening choice (s = 0:4), so the only di¤erence from a societal standpoint is the deadweight cost of the …nes. When ¿ is only 1%, this deadweight cost is small; the regulator is willing to pay this cost when there are not too many high banks in the economy. However, the private cost to the high banks of type-unobservability is much larger. The private after-tax value to the high bank of its optimal observable-type contract equals the social value of 1.71993, 19 while the corresponding private value of the equilibrium contract under type-unobservability varies from 1.63905 to 1.70902 as h high varies from 0.01 to 0.88. All these values are less than the private value accruing to the high type when bank type is observable. In contrast, Table  5 shows that, when bank type is unobservable, the low-type banks receive a private after-tax value that in all cases exceeds what they receive under type observability. In particular, this value when type is observed is 1.11990, whereas when type is private information these values range between 1.12067 and 1.19065 (for h hig h between 0.01 to 0.88).
Thus, the optimal contracts under type-unobservability in e¤ect transfer value from high to low types. In this sense, the more productive banks bear the full costs of type-unobservability, even though these high-type banks are com pletely self-regulating when type is public knowledge. This is relevant for regu latory practice. It is often argued that the vast majority of banks have strong incentives to behave in a prudent and value-maximizing manner. These banks are essentially self-regulating, since their private incentives are well aligned with social imperatives. However, if there are enough po or quality banks, and if the regulators have imperfect information about bank quality, then it may be nec essary to impose a heavy superstructure of regulation on the high banks just in order to a¤ect the incentives of the low banks.
Contrast the optimal contracts in the case described above to the case where the fraction of high types reaches 99.5% or higher. This case is displayed in the last column of Table 3 . At this point the regulator simply assigns the high type its optimal contract under type-observability. With our parameterization, this contract is completely unregulated (zero capital, zero …nes). Since we require both …nes and capital to be non-negative, there is no way to dissuade the low type bank from misrepresenting type. (No other contract can dominate the zero capital, zero …ne contract in the low type's private valuation.) As a result, the two types must be assigned the same contract and the truth-telling constraints hold trivially. The low-type bank then chooses a suboptimally low screening level of 0.3. However, the fraction of low-type banks is so small that the regulator simply does not care about the suboptimally low mean output from these banks. (For higher values of ¿ , this threshold is reached at lower values of h hig h .)
Finally, let us brie ‡y consider the intermediate case where h high is between 0.89 and 0.99: When the fraction of high types is in this range, the social cost of …nes on the high-type banks is su¢ciently onerous that the regulator wishes to reduce these …nes. But to maintain truth-telling, the regulator must simulta neously increase the value of the low-type contracts. If it did not do so, the low type banks would misrepresent themselves as high types. In all the examples we have computed, the regulator gives additional value to the low-type banks by assigning them a mixed contract that randomizes between a high-…ne, low (or zero) capital contract and a low-(or zero-) …ne, high capital contract. As an example, consider the second-to-last column in Table 3 , which exhibits the optimal contract in our baseline model with h high = 0:89. As compared to the contract for h high = 0:88, the regulator reduces the …nes on the high type, imposing a zero …ne on r = 2:5 and a lower …ne on r = 2:0. In order to increase the utility of the low type, the regulator randomizes between the opti mal type-observable contract (zero capital, …ne of 1.8910 on the highest return) and the optimal type-observable contract with capital only (14% capital, zero …nes). This random contract gives the low-type bank higher private value, …rst because it imposes a lower expected …ne, and second because (as discussed in Section 4.4.1) it exploits the di¤erences in the curvature of the two types' utility functions. As shown in the second-to-last column of Table 5 , the social value of this mixed contract is lower than the non-random contract, but the regulator is willing to forego this value in order to reduce the …ne on the high-type banks. Note that both the private and social values of the high-type contract are higher in the case than when h hig h = 0:88.
Conclusion
This paper studies a bank capital regulation model in which deposit insurance causes a potentially lower level of expected output because it creates a taste for risk that reduces marginal incentives to exert screening e¤ort. Capital regulation of the sort commonly seen in regulatory practice is fairly e¤ective at o¤setting this distortion. However, state-contingent tools are shown to be more powerful. Fines can induce optimal screening e¤ort while economizing on (or eliminating entirely) the use of costly capital.
We learned a number of lessons from this exercise. First, a powerful reason the regulator might seek to deter risk is to induce banks to choose a higher mean portfolio. Second, unobserved heterogeneity does not eliminate the usefulness of state-contingent …nes as a regulatory tool. On the contrary, …nes are still useful, both to deter misrepresentation of type and to deter suboptimal choices after type has been truthfully revealed. Third, the likelihood ratio principle guides the choice of return levels on which to impose the …nes. In particular, …nes at the highest return level tend to be used whenever the objective is to deter high risk-taking. Fourth, for most distribution of types, the low type receives its optimal type-observable contract. The utility given to the low type by these contracts is at least as great as that under type-observability. In contrast, the high type only receives its type-observable contract when there are so few low types that the regulator is unconcerned with separating types. Otherwise, the high type is given a contract that provides a strictly lower utility level than he would receive under type-observability. Finally, …nes are potentially a less costly way of separating types than the pure capital requirements that are the focus of much regulatory practice. When …nes are precluded, the regulator generally gives up any attempt to separate types, even though this is feasible in principle via randomization. However, when …nes are included in the regulatory tool kit (with a relatively low cost ¿ of 0.01), the regulator almost always chooses to separate types.
The model justi…es the regulatory focus on capital adequacy and safety-and soundness (interpreted as risk reduction), since both of these approaches can potentially o¤set the distortions induced by the deposit insurance put option. However, a reservation one might raise with the results of this paper is that state-contingent …nes per se are not typically observed in regulatory practice. Furthermore, the equilibrium contracts in this paper often require …nes on high returns, an approach that could encounter political and even legal obstacles. In future research, we are considering other regulatory instruments, such as costly risk audits, that have the potential of delivering similar results as those found in this paper while conforming more closely to observed practice.
A Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
When …nes are set to zero, the bank's objective in equation (9) becomes
0 If s > 0, then the …rst-and second-order necessary conditions for optimal choice of s are:
To determine s 0 (D ), the response of s to a change in D, totally di¤erentiate equation (24) with respect to D :
which implies
Second order condition (25) implies that
According to equations, (1), (2) , and (29), s 0 (D ) < 0, 8D < r ¤ (¹; ¾) as in the statement of the proposition.
B Appendix B: Solving the Regulator's Prob lem with Heterogeneous Agents
We solved our numerical examples by formulating the Regulator's Problem as a linear program and then solving the problem using standard linear programming code. There are two steps to the linearization. The …rst step is to allow random ization in the contractual terms. This means that the regulator may randomly recommend (D; s; ¾) combinations to each bank type. We write this probabil ity distribution as ! i (s; ¾; D). Fines now need to depend on the realization of ! i (s; ¾; D). Fines could also be random but because of the linear preferences and objective function we can write them as g i (r; s; ¾ ; D ). The second step of the linearization is to discretize the sets of variables, that is, the g, r , s, ¾, and D . These grids are straightforward except for the …ne grid. The upper bound on …nes depends on D and r because of limited liability. For this reason we use as our …ne grid f0; maxf0; r ¡ D gg. Because of the linear preferences, a two point grid is all we need to capture all relevant …nes. (Lotteries over the two points capture everything in between.) To formulate the problem as a linear program we solve for the joint distri bution over the grid of variables for each type. Let ¼ i (g; r; s; ¾; D ) denote the conditional joint probability of a type-i bank receiving assignment (D; s; ¾); re alizing return r (if the recommended (s; ¾) are taken) and being assessed …ne g: (To keep the notation simple, we do not write out the explicit dependence of g on the realization of r and D.) Embedded in this ob ject are the two choice vari ables of the regulator, the mixing probabilities ! i (s; ¾; D) and the …ne schedule g i (r; s; ¾; D). They are related to the joint distribution as follows:
g;r and
g Equation (31) gives the expected level of the …ne given the return, assignment, and reported type, which is all we need for utility and welfare purposes. Our strategy is to let the regulator directly choose the joint probability distribution ¼ i (g; r; s; ¾; D). To guarantee that this object is a probability dis tribution, we restrict its elements to be non-negative and we require that In choosing the joint distribution, the regulator is implicitly choosing the probability of assignments, (30) , and the …ne schedule, (31). Still, there is a technological relationship between the return and the investment strategy that must not be violated. In particular, the identity 
The next set of constraints are the moral-hazard constraints. These con straints guarantee that the bank takes the recommended investment strategy risk levels, then there are (n s n ¾ ) (n s n ¾ ) constraints of the form (35) per (i; j) pair, deposit combination. 2 1 Fortunately, this serious curse of dimensionality can be dealt with by reformulating the truth-telling constraint. In this reformulation, an additional choice variable w(s; ¾; D; i; j) is introduced that keeps track of the maximum o¤-equilibrium utility a type-i agent can receive if he reports his type as j and is recommended (D; s; ¾). 22 This solution strategy was anticipated in the way we wrote equation (13) in the Regulator's Problem, where the utility from o¤ equilibrium strategies was dealt with by using the max operator rather than enumerating all the possible o¤-equilibrium strategies. The o¤-equilibrium util ity constraints are 8s; ¾; s; ¾; D; i; j 6 = i :
These constraints give the most utility a type-i bank can receive if it reports that it is a type-j bank and is assigned (D; s; ¾ ). This utility is weighed by ! j (s; ¾; D): The o¤-equilibrium utility can now be used to guarantee truthtelling. The truth-telling constraints are The left-hand side is the utility from telling the truth and taking the recom mended action while the right-hand side is the utility the agent would receive from lying and then taking the best o¤-equilibrium strategy possible. The result of this reformulation is that for the example in the paper with eight di¤erent investment strategies we only need (n s n ¾ ) 2 + 1 constraints per (i; j) pair, deposit combination to satisfy the above truth-telling condition. This substantial reduction in the size of the linear program made it feasible for us to study the problem in this paper. The program is
In the examples of section 4 there are four possible sc reening levels and two possible risk le vels, so the total number of constraints (35) pe r (i; j) pair, deposit combination would equal 16,777,216. 2 2 This strategy is based on the one used by Prescott (2003) to deal with a similar mode l where the shock was to an agent's marginal disutility of e¤ort. subject to probability measure constraints (32), technology constraints (33), moral-hazard constraints (34), o¤-equilibrium incentive constraints (36), and truth-telling constraints (37).
The program is a linear program. There is a …nite number of constraints and a …nite number of choice variables: ¼ i (g; r; s; ¾; D) and w(s; ¾; D; i; j) for each type i, j 6 = i and each point in the (g; r; s; ¾; D ) grid. We wrote our code for creating the linear programming coe¢cients in Matlab. The linear program was then solved by calling Minos, a Fortran program solver developed at the Stanford Systems Optimization Laboratory. Minos was called using the TOMLAB optimization library. To check the accuracy of the code we also independently programmed the problem in the GAMS programming language, and then called Minos from GAMS. Table 2 : This table gives the details of the optimal contracts for the low type bank and the high type bank in the baseline case when fines are prohibited, so the regulator only uses capital requirements. The parameterization used is: r = 0.05, g = 1.0. The first two panels, labeled "Low Type," give the details of the contract for the low type bank. (The second panel is only used if the optimal contract for the low type randomizes between two contract assignments.) The third panel gives the contract for the high type bank. Each panel gives the probability of the assignment (1.0 unless a random contract is used), and the assigned screening level, risk level, and capital level. The first column, labeled "Public", gives the optimal contract when type is public information. The remaining three columns give the optimal contract when type is private information and the percentage of high type banks takes three different ranges. The parameters correspond to the baseline parameterization in Section 4.2: m min = {0, 0.6}, m max = {1.7, 2.3}, a = {5, 5}, r = 0.05, t = 0.01, g=1.0. Table 3 : This table gives the details of the optimal contracts for the low type bank and the high type bank under the baseline parameterization: t = 0.01, r = 0.05, g = 1.0. The first two panels, labeled "Low Type," give the details of the contract for the low type bank. The second panel is only used if the optimal contract randomizes between two contract assignments. The third panel gives the contract for the high type bank. (In the baseline parameterization, the high type bank is never assigned a randomized contract.) Each panel gives the probability of the assignment (1.0 unless a randomized contract is used), the assigned screening level, risk level, and capital level, and the amount of fines on each of the seven return levels. The first column gives the optimal contract when type is public information. The remaining three columns give the optimal contract when type is unobservable and the percentage of high type banks takes three different values or ranges. The parameters correspond to the baseline parameterization in Section 4.2: m min = {0, 0.6}, m max = {1.7, 2.3}, a = {5, 5}, r = 0.05, t = 0.01, g=1.0. Table 4 displays the value of the bank's objective ("Private Value") and the regulator's objective ("Social Value ") for the optimal lowtype contract and the optimal high-type contract as a function of type (low or high), risk level s and screening level s. The optimal contract for a low-type bank has zero capital and a fine of 1.8910 on the highest return. The optimal contract for a high-type bank has zero capital and a fine of 0.8917 on the return equal to 2.0 and a fine of 0.4321 on the return equal to 2.5. The parameters correspond to the baseline parameterization in Section 4.2: m min = {0, 0.6}, m max = {1.7, 2.3}, a = {5, 5}, r = 0.05, t = 0.01, g=1.0. Private value of contract before taxes:
----------------------
Private value of contract after taxes:
